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The Canadian War Museum
and the Military Identity
of an Unmilitary People
Norman Hillmer

T

he Canadian War Museum was
its country’s first national history
museum, but also one of the most
neglected of federal institutions. Its
usual fate was pedestrian quarters,
meagre financial resources, and a
miniscule staff. Canada, after all,
styled itself as the very opposite
of a warrior society. Governments
promoted an official brand of
nationalism that obliterated the
internal divisions and dilemmas that
Canada’s wars exposed.1 Their project
succeeded, and not simply with
Canadians. One visitor to Ottawa,
a museum scholar from California,
was astonished by the very idea of a
Canadian War Museum. The image
of Canada that rushed to her mind
was that of the cartoon Mountie
Dudley Do-Right, not of a country
with a long pedigree of military
service and distinction.2
Yet a magnificent new Canadian
War Museum building rose up in
the national capital during the first
years of the twenty-first century.
The renaissance of the war museum
was the result of an extraordinary
alchemy of events and impulses that
challenges the notion of Canadians
as an unmilitary people.
Military conflict and military
endeavour are woven into the
national fibre, 3 but post-Second
World War Canadians constructed

Abstract: Late in the twentieth
century, intent on a new vision and
new building for their museum,
Canadian War Museum planners
crafted an interpretative scenario
that emphasized the military as a
national symbol and the importance
of war and conflict in the shaping of
Canada and Canadians. A striking
architectural design followed, and a
renewed war museum opened in May
2005. A flood of visitors came, and
they have continued to come. Public
prominence has brought applause
and controversy as a buried military
identity is refolded into the nationalist
narratives of Canada.

an understanding of themselves that
made it easy to overlook the pivotal
role of warfare in the definition
of their country. Modern Canada
began to see itself, and ostentatiously
describe itself, as cosmopolitan,
progressive, tolerant, generous – and
peaceful. The military personnel who
caught the national imagination were
Canada’s peacekeepers, who became
the leading international practitioners
of the craft. The country’s foreign
minister, L. B. Pearson, won the 1957
Nobel Peace Prize for the diplomacy
that had solved the Suez Crisis
(and “saved the world,” in the
words of the Nobel Committee)
with the expedient of a Middle East
peacekeeping force. Although it
wasn’t true, Pearson got credit for
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having invented peacekeeping, and
politicians for decades after tried to
repeat his success. There was hardly
a peacekeeping mission in the second
half of the twentieth century that did
not have Canadian participation.4
Peacekeeping might constitute a
very small part of the defence budget,
but it bulked very large in the public
and official mind. Peacekeeping
became indelibly Canadian as national
interests, ideals, and expectations
combined, accumulated, and took
firm hold. With peacekeeping came
the conviction that other countries
waged war, and that a superbly,
supremely moral Canada cleaned
up their messes. The world needed
Canada, the belief went, just as
Canada needed the world.5
The peacekeepers of the United
Nations were given the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1988, an award that
Canadians promptly appropriated
to themselves. Two years later the
government of Canada decided to
erect a peacekeeping monument
to reflect “a dramatic shift in the
role and purpose of the Canadian
Armed Forces” and to represent “a
fundamental Canadian value: no
missionary zeal to impose our way
of life on others but an acceptance
of the responsibility to assist them
in determining their own futures
by ensuring a non-violent climate
19
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it fights still. An outspoken general,
Chief of the Defence Staff Rick
Hillier, championed the war effort,
downgraded peacekeeping, and
forged a populist link between the
military and the people. Politicians,
who had already begun to respond to
the increasing calls for more defence
spending, incorporated military
themes and support for the Canadian
Forces into their rhetoric. Canadian
governments under Paul Martin and
Stephen Harper, the first a Liberal
and the other a Conservative, agreed
that a robust military engagement
with the world was indispensable
to Canada’s national security and
international standing. The public
seemed to take the same view.9
The war museum had meanwhile
stumbled into the 1990s.10 Its building
had a prominent address at 330
Sussex Street, beside the Royal
Canadian Mint and not far from
the residences of the prime minister
and governor general. However,
the structure, the former national
archives, was unsuited to the needs
of a museum. The inadequacies, in
the words of war museum historian
Cameron Pulsifer, who had to live
with them, were manifold, ranging
from “awkward and cramped exhibit
space, environmental conditions
which were hazardous to artifacts,
the lack of a freight elevator, floor
loading capacities that could not
support heavy artifacts, and lack
of space for educational and other
public activities.” 11 Moreover, the
war museum was dwarfed by a new
next door neighbour, the Moshe
Safdie designed National Gallery
of Canada, which spilled onto the
museum’s property. Next to the
gallery’s imposing modern glass
structure, the Canadian War Museum
looked more ancient and threadbare
than ever.

Canadian War Museum (CWM) 20020045-1904

commercial played repeatedly before
and on 11 November; it featured a
contemporary young man’s telephone
call home from a Second World War
battlefield in France thanking his
grandfather for his military service.
In May 2000 Canada’s Unknown
Soldier was brought from France
and interred at the National War
Memorial in the centre of Ottawa, in
front of 20,000 observers and millions
more on television.
After years of neglect, veterans
and veterans’ issues were being
integrated into ideas of what it
meant to be Canadian. A Veterans
Memorial Highway sprung up on
the road leading away from Ottawa
towards the United States, and a
parade of other memorials, coins,
stamps, advertisements, and tributes
marched into the cultural content of
Canadian identity. The vets became
“imbedded in a powerful narrative of
sacrifice, honour and nationhood.”8
When the Cold War ended, the
Canadian Forces found themselves
challenged to justify
their existence on
the one hand and
yet busier than
ever on the other
hand. Peace support
opportunities
abounded, and
Ottawa seldom
refused international
requests, but the
trend as the last
decade of the
century dwindled
away was toward
enforcement and
combat operations
of the type Canada
carried out in
the Balkans. In
2002, the country
went to war in
Afghanistan, where
Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre ISC00-400-25

in which to do so.” So read the
guideline for the competition to
choose the monument’s sculptor. 6
The monument was unveiled in
1992, very near the National Gallery
and the Canadian War Museum and
pointing directly at Parliament Hill.
At the same time, however,
a Canadian military identity that
stood apart from peacekeeping
was beginning to reassert itself.
The celebrations of the fiftieth
anniversaries of the last years of
the Second World War brought its
diminishing numbers of veterans
to the fore. They and their lobby
groups in turn took a notable role
in promoting their causes and
defending themselves against
revisionist history that questioned
their actions and sometimes their
integrity.7 Remembrance Day on 11
November, the date that the First
World War had ended, attracted
more attention and more participants
and spectators. Late in the 1990s
a popular Bell Canada television

The repatriation of Canada’s unknown soldier in May 2000 capped a
decade of growing interest in Canada’s military identity.
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The original Canadian War Museum on Sussex Drive (here photographed in 1967) enjoyed a prominent location in
Ottawa (note the Parliament Buildings in the background) but the building itself was unsuitable for a national museum.

The 1991 report of a Task Force on
Military History Museum Collections
in Canada damned the museum as
an “embarrassment” and a “national
disgrace.” 12 The report concluded
that contemporary museum design
and technology had far outpaced the
Canadian War Museum’s practices,
while the research function, on which
an historical museum depended, was
completely inadequate. Well covered
in the media, the report demanded
better resources for the museum
and suggested that it would be
better off as an independent agency,
separate from its parent institution,
the Canadian Museum of Civilization
Corporation (CMCC). The CMCC
responded to the criticisms with
$1.7 million for the war museum’s
exhibits. A contract was then awarded
to the Toronto architect A. J. Diamond
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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for the design of an extension to 330
Sussex that would make use of the
space in front of the building, which
was set well back from the street.
Further government help for
the war museum was not in the
immediate offing. Spendthrift
Canadian governments, over
decades, had run up a mountain
of debt and deficits that were no
longer sustainable. Budget cuts
were expected for every federal
institution, and they were ruthlessly
implemented by a Liberal government
elected in the fall of 1993. Officials at
the Museum of Civilization and the
war museum began to cast around
for ways to attract financial support
and sponsorships. The Friends of the
Canadian War Museum, a volunteer
group of museum supporters,
announced in 1995, fifty years to

the day after the end of the Second
World War in Europe, that they
would spearhead a major fundraising
effort. “Passing the Torch,” the
campaign was called, to convey the
responsibility of Canadians to carry
forth the work of earlier generations.
Passing the Torch set out to
assist the museum with its plans to
modernize 330 Sussex. In its initial
phase, as revealed in internal war
museum documentation, the drive
to raise money looked to “critical
national and ethnic groups as an
important source of funding that will
prove crucial to the ultimate success
of the campaign.” 13 Prime targets
were wealthy Jewish and Dutch
veterans, with the eventual goal of
raising $2 million from each group.
A Netherlands Memorial Theatre
was contemplated, to highlight
21
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Canada’s role in the liberation of
Holland in 1944-1945. So too was
a gallery concentrated on Jewish
Canadian war heroes. Since contacts
with Jewish Canadians revealed their
interest in integrating a remembrance
of the Holocaust into the refurbished
war museum, that became part of the
planning as well.
Recognizing the opportunity
to graft these proposals onto their
dreams of transforming the Canadian
War Museum into a major facility,
the director and CEO of the Museum
of Civilization, George MacDonald,
and senior war museum officials
picked up on the possibilities. In
mid-1995 MacDonald approached the
Bronfman Foundation, the Montrealbased philanthropic organization, to
ask that it help underwrite a Jewish
gallery. He was aware, however,
of the pitfalls of raising issues of
cultural and religious sensitivity.
The gallery would not pivot around
the Holocaust. Charles Bronfman,
the foundation’s key figure, agreed
with MacDonald. Bronfman was
reportedly “more interested in
celebrating Jewish achievement
than in reviewing past historical
injustices.”14
These views did not carry the day
for long. Over 1996 and into 1997, the
scheme to honour Jewish Canadians
transmogrified into a vision of a
gallery that had the Holocaust as its
only subject. When planning began,
the Holocaust Gallery was expected to
cover 2,000 square feet. That number
ballooned to 2,500 and then 4,000
square feet, and finally was projected
to come in at 6,000 square feet, which
would have made it the largest
gallery in the war museum by a factor
of four. George MacDonald declared
the creation of a Holocaust Gallery
a major corporate priority of the
Museum of Civilization Corporation.
Victor Suthren, the director of the war
museum, embraced the concept and
pushed it forward. Charles Bronfman
and his foundation were nowhere to
be seen, but other prominent Jewish
22
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Canadians took up the cause. One of
them was the historian Irving Abella,
an expert on Canada and the Jews of
Europe in the 1930s and 1940s.
It is easier to chart the upward
trajectory of the Holocaust Gallery
than to explain quite how and why
the project acquired a dominant
place in museum thinking. The
fundraising potential loomed
large, without doubt, the more so
because a survey of visitors to the
museum had demonstrated interest
in the Holocaust. The appeal and
success of the Holocaust Museum in
Washington also invited imitation;
Suthren was energized by a visit there
in March 1996. At that stage the plan
was still to feature the war service
of Jewish Canadians in what was
then being called the “Holocaust and
Jewish War Veterans Gallery.” That
idea was jettisoned by year’s end,
however, the reasoning being that a
gallery given over to one identifiable
grouping would fuel the expectations
of other groups. There would be no
stopping the demands for further
galleries. A war museum document
concluded that “a collection of little
such galleries would destroy the
integrity of our current and planned
exhibits and galleries.”15
The war museum was right
to refuse to cut up its mandate
and share it with outside interests.
Yet it was wrong to think that a
Holocaust Gallery would be free of
external constraints. Suthren and his
allies, moreover, hatched the idea
of using the Holocaust “as a means
of addressing intolerance, prejudice
and the dehumanizing of other ethnic
groups which lie behind not only past
wars but current issues such as ‘ethnic
cleansing’ in Yugoslavia, Rwandan
atrocities, and many other problems
which Canadian peacekeepers are
called on to address.” The swing
in emphasis was in line, Suthren
maintained, “with the museum’s
increasing focus on the origins of
human conflict in general as opposed
to a mere chronicling of the military

past.”16 The museum was moving
away from its moorings and on
to dangerous ground. It would be
vulnerable to every spasm in the
body politic and every imaginable
charge of ethnic bias.
Holocaust Gallery committees
and opinions, expert and not,
proliferated. Critics emerged,
notably history professor Robert
Bothwell, a member of the Museum
of Civilization Corporation Board
of Trustees, and his University of
Toronto colleague, Michael Marrus,
an authority on the Holocaust.
They counselled caution, citing the
inadequate research capacity of the
museum, and the sheer scope and
complexity of the Holocaust itself.
The presentation of the Holocaust
catastrophe, Marrus pointed out in
a memorandum of April 1997, “is a
particularly formidable challenge. It
is all the more difficult because debate
on many issues continues, because
some areas remain contentious, and
because responsible people differ
considerably in their emphases
and interpretations. As often with
historical subjects, while historians
debate, the more public search
for meaning sometimes fluctuates
strongly. Different communities and
different generations draw different
lessons and significance from the
Holocaust.”17
MacDonald took these
arguments very seriously, as was
his responsibility. He drew away
from Suthren, his subordinate in the
chain of command. When Suthren
demanded a vote of confidence from
MacDonald, it was not forthcoming.
The two men parted company,
Suthren’s tenure at the war museum
ending in early October 1997.
Suthren had not survived, but
the Holocaust Gallery did. The A.
J. Diamond architectural plan was
made public in mid-November 1997.
At a cost of $12 million, Diamond
proposed three substantial additions
to 330 Sussex, including a glass dome
that would cover the courtyard in
4
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front of the building, extending it out
to the street. The revolutionized war
museum would have much enhanced
exhibit space, a Memorial Chamber,
a theatre, and room to display some
of the war art collection that was the
museum’s hidden treasure. None
of these welcome changes caught
much interest. What did was a 6,000
square foot gallery exclusively set
aside to describe and remember the
Holocaust.
The formal announcement that
the Holocaust would be a prominent
aspect of a revamped museum
mobilized Canada’s veterans, who
were quick to point out that they
had not been consulted about the
decision and had felt marginalized
by war museum management over
many years. They set out to defeat
the idea, arguing that the Holocaust
was a horrible part of history, but not
part of Canada’s history, and more
particularly not part of Canada’s
military history. Their story had
been hijacked by someone else’s
story. At the helm of the opposition
campaign was Clifford Chadderton,
the savvy president of the National
Council of Veterans Associations,
a longtime Ottawa lobbyist who
knew his way around the media.
George MacDonald fought back as
best he could, but he was no match
for Chadderton and other veterans’
groups, whose publicity machines
ensured widespread coverage of the
vets’ point of view.
Politicians, sniffing publicity,
involved themselves. A parliamentary
committee, the Senate Subcommittee
on Veterans Affairs, summoned
MacDonald and the chair of the
Board of Trustees of the Museum of
Civilization Corporation, Adrienne
Clarkson, to hearings on the
Holocaust Gallery issue in early
1998. They, and Clarkson especially,
encountered fierce antagonism from
committee members, and from the
veterans and other opponents of the
gallery who populated the hearings.
The committee’s mind was made up.
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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The Holocaust Gallery was a travesty.
Clarkson and MacDonald were
scarcely allowed to speak. Utterly
defeated, they announced that the
gallery would have to go.18
The salvation of the war museum
had come disguised as a crisis. The
Holocaust Gallery debacle brought
the parlous condition of the museum
to national attention and cleared the
way for the dynamic leadership and
ideas that resulted in an innovative
new building with a clear if complex
message about the Canadian military
identity.
The government had already
moved to still the commotion, and
give direction to the war museum,
after Suthren’s departure. The
previous autumn, minister of
Canadian heritage Sheila Copps,
whose responsibilities included
the national museums, named
Barney Danson to the Museum of
Civilization’s Board of Trustees
and to a war museum advisory
committee, which he would head and
which would give a voice to veterans
and scholars alike.19 Danson was a
well-connected politician from the
party in power, a former minister
of national defence, and a Jewish
veteran who had been wounded in
the Second World War. He could
speak to both sides of the Holocaust
debate, and he had the political clout
to manoeuvre his powerful friends
into action.
Danson wanted the Holocaust
remembered, but not in the war
museum. The modest A. J. Diamond
extension to the war museum ought
to be reserved completely for the
museum’s own collection, most of
which was in precarious storage
at Vimy House, an old streetcar
barn visited from time to time by
flooding. The Danson committee
concluded, in fact, that the Diamond
plan did not go nearly far enough.
The war museum needed a fresh
start in a new building, and in the
meantime, it needed the intellectual
respectability that had been missing

from the Suthren era, when elaborate
re-enactments of historical events
passed for scholarly substance.
Danson recruited J. L. Granatstein,
the country’s best known historian,
as the museum’s director and chief
executive officer for a two year term.20
The Granatstein goal was
excellence, energetically delivered,
and he shook the antiquated museum
to its roots. He extracted more money
to add to the tiny museum budget,
oversaw the correction of hundreds
of errors in exhibits, set up a Centre
of Military History and a publishing
program, restored relations with
Canada’s military museums and
the Canadian Forces, and squeezed
more autonomy from the Museum
of Civilization. Most important of all,
and as a condition of his employment,
Granatstein hired three established
military historians: Roger Sarty, Dean
Oliver, and Serge Durflinger.21
The museum’s research team,
now led by Sarty and Oliver,
developed a uniform vision for the
future, which they housed in the
interpretative scenario, an evolving
document that was tested across the
country and before various publics.
It was driven by the story line of
Canada’s military experiences, and
the belief that the country’s history
had been formed by them. Everything
in the museum from the organization
chart through collections policy and
exhibit development flowed from
the interpretative scenario, tracking
Granatstein’s straightforward view
that the war museum must “be
research-based, chronological, and
historically accurate,” or it was
nothing. Intellectual integrity had
to be at the gut of any reputable
museum.22
Within a month of Granatstein’s
arrival at the war museum to take
up his duties in July of 1998, the
plan for the Diamond expansion of
330 Sussex was on hold. Danson,
with his extensive contacts, had
been at work. He managed to secure
an ample parcel of property near
23
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Left & right: The new Canadian
War Museum located on the
LeBreton Flats opened in May
2005.

24
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the contamination was removed.25
Briefly an architecture student before
he became a lawyer, Chrétien took
a special interest and pride in the
creation of a grand building that
he believed, as the New York Times
later reported, would celebrate the
national capital as a place that stood
for something more than and beyond
politics.26
The architects chosen for the
war museum project, on the basis of
their response to the interpretative
scenario document, were Raymond
Moriyama and Alexander Rankin,
backed by large teams from their
respective firms. The museum’s
research group assembled historical
images that captured the storyline
in visual terms for the architects’
use, while Moriyama and Rankin
crossed the country, coming to poetic
conclusions about Canada’s character
and diversity. As a young boy,
Moriyama and his family had been
among the thousands of Canadian
Japanese who were removed from
their homes and relocated to camps
during the Second World War;
Rankin was from Northern Ireland, a
land torn apart by sectarian violence.
Both were convinced that modern
Canada was very different from
what they had known. Moriyama
recalled that in his consultations
with Canadians he found history’s
wounds in abundance, “and yet all the
speakers shared a wish for a brighter
future of inclusion and hope.” He

bound the theme of regeneration into
his museum design, and manipulated
the building on a gentle rise towards
the Peace Tower of the Parliament
Buildings, in a silent salute to “the
symbolic home of all Canadians.”27
Moriyama and Rankin
exploited the natural contours of
Canadian geography and historical
development. The museum seemed,
deliberately, to be more landscape
than architecture. Staying low and
hugging the ground, it resembled a
traveller hunkered down to brave a
stiff prairie wind. It reached out from
Ontario to the hills of Quebec on the
western side of the LeBreton site, and
to the east toward central Ottawa
and Parliament, the vertical wedge
of Regeneration Hall mimicking an
Arctic whale, or the Rocky Mountains,
or Canada itself as it moved on a
steady upward climb from colony
to country. Canada and its people,
Rankin was convinced, were “quiet,
modest, and strong,” just as their
museum would be.28
The museum’s architecture
got at war through the use of tilted
planes and rough hewn materials,
creating an impression of trauma
and disequilibrium. On the exterior
Moriyama created the effect of war
visited on the land. On the inside
he sought the intensity of an urban
landscape scarred by battle: “Walls
emerge sharp and unrefined from
the floors at jagged angles. Concrete
is left raw and exposed. Joints of

CWM NCWM_28

the National Aviation Museum on
the Ottawa River, a gift from the
Department of National Defence,
which was closing the Rockcliffe
Canadian Forces Base.23 Granatstein
promoted the cause of a Rockcliffe
museum across the country. He
secured a Donner Foundation grant
to put some of the war museum’s
13,000 art works on tour, reasoning
that “the collection was its trump
card with those who might not
think battles or tanks or medals
mattered.”24 Funding commitments
were sought, painstakingly. Passing
the Torch pledged $15 million, and
the government committed $58
million in March 2000. A new war
museum, unimaginable just months
before, was in view.
There was one last twist in the
renewal of the Canadian War Museum.
Danson and Granatstein were elated
by the 35 acre Rockcliffe plot, which
had plenty of space for outdoor
displays, ceremonies, parking, and
picnicking. The project was well
advanced when Prime Minister
Jean Chrétien intervened to change
the site to the more central location
of LeBreton Flats, a short distance
from the National War Memorial
and the Parliament Buildings. The
LeBreton area had been rejected
early on in the planning because
the ground was full of pollutants,
the legacy of heavy industrial use
decades before. The prime minister
had the problem solved forthwith;

6
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muted, and to little effect, in part
because no one could dispute that
the terrible event had taken place. It
had been photographed. It was real
and shameful. It was part of Canada’s
past. The regiment involved had
been disbanded. The president of
the powerful veterans interest group,
the Royal Canadian Legion, was
prepared to let the matter pass.31
A more serious attack on the
war museum’s integrity came when
veterans, although not all veterans,
condemned the interpretation of the
Second World War allied bombing
of Germany, in which some 20,000
Canadian airmen participated
and half of that number died. The
controversy centred on a concluding
panel containing two stark assertions:
that the value and morality of strategic
bombing remained bitterly contested,
and that the bomber offensive had
been largely ineffective until late in
the war.32 Accompanying the words
were photographs of the destructive
impact of the bombing on German
cities and civilians. The war museum
had consulted with the veterans as
the Second World War gallery was
being developed. Changes were
made, including information about
the extent to which enemy resources
were tied down by the bomber

offensive, but the offending panel
and the graphic photos remained.33
Again the veterans mounted a
withering attack, and again the Senate
Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs
implicated itself, with similar impacts
and similar results. Prominent in the
veterans’ charge was Paul Manson, a
Cold War pilot, former Chief of the
Defence Staff, and the person who had
led Passing the Torch’s fundraising
for the new museum. The veterans
and their interest groups insisted
that the bombing had been crucial in
bringing Hitler to his knees, and that
the war museum was accusing the air
veterans of immorality at best and
criminality at worst. War museum
officials testified at the committee
hearings, saying that they were
making no value judgements about
the airmen; they pointed out that
the exhibit as a whole demonstrated
Canadian heroism and sacrifice,
and contextualized the bombing
campaign in a manner sympathetic to
the allied side. Professional historians
weighed in on the debate, but they
were of differing views.34
The senators were not. The
museum was “technically and
professionally correct in its stand,”
the subcommittee reported, but the
vets had been insulted and should

CWM NCWM_28

forms are rough.” The contractors
for the building were instructed to
achieve “a controlled imperfection.”29
Novelist Alan Cumyn’s first visit
to the museum revealed an almost
omnipresent “grey, unadorned
concrete angled back as if to deflect
the shock of explosions, and cut only
with narrow slit windows.” He felt
“off-balance and uncomfortable,
in keeping with the jarring and
fractured nature of war.”30
Veterans liked almost all of what
they saw in the striking new museum,
but not everything, and they had been
conditioned to believe that what they
did not like was not acceptable. The
Holocaust Gallery experience had
raised expectations that they would
have a permanent role in deciding
how the future museum would look
and what it would include and omit,
a belief that was reinforced by the
museum’s mandate to be a place
of remembrance as well as a war
museum.
When the museum opened,
the veterans were immediately
unhappy about artistic renderings
of a photograph that showed a
Canadian soldier holding a baton to
the throat of a Somali teenager, who
subsequently died of his wounds.
Their complaints, however, were

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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be given their due. The panel ought
to be revisited and revised.35 The
Board of Trustees of the Museum
of Civilization Corporation agreed
to do so, and the director of the war
museum, Joe Guerts, was forced
out in the bargain. The panel was
reworked by senior representatives
of the CMCC and the war museum,
and discussed with the veterans
and David Bashow, an historian
favourable to the vets’ interpretation.
It was history by committee. The
new text was three times as long as
the discarded panel and many times
less direct. Glossed over were salient
facts, notably that the bombing
campaign in which the Canadians
were involved (with no share in
decision making) was explicitly
designed to destroy Germany’s
cities and kill civilians. 36 Shades
of the Smithsonian Institution’s
capitulation in 1995, the critics of
the decision shouted, when protests
erupted and a director’s head had
rolled over an exhibit featuring
the Enola Gay, the airplane that
had dropped an atomic bomb on
Japan forty years before.37 The war
museum, however, could draw on
a great deal of media, academic,
and public support – and on its own
expert staff. It had not withdrawn
the exhibit as the Smithsonian had,
the photographs accompanying the
panel were not altered or abandoned,
and the museum insisted on historical
accuracy in the rewriting of the
Bomber Command panel.
The Canadian War Museum
was a witness to, participant in, and
beneficiary of a significant shift in
the country’s socio-political culture.
The engagement and prominence of
the vets were part of the story, but
only part. In the short time since
the opening of the museum in 2005,
well over two million visitors have
come to a hall of history and memory
that emphasizes the military as a
national symbol, and the importance
of war and conflict in the making
of Canada and Canadians. The
26
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss3/3

Hillmer - CWM.indd 26

building’s architects did not shy
away from the horrors of war, but
they shared the commonplace conceit
of Canadians that they have fought
wars and sacrificed lives for the right
reasons, not for gain or glory. The
museum’s unflinching portrayals
of conflict, suffering, and death are
lashed to lofty messages of peace,
hope, and rebirth. A military people
perhaps, but if so, a people with a
particular way of war.
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From the Editor-in-Chief
… continued from page 2
an important disjunction between
the veterans of the French Canadian
22nd Battalion who celebrated
their comradeship in arms in a
sacred cause, and the increasingly
predominant nationaliste view that
the war was a British one of no
interest to true Canadians. When
Geoff presented his results at the
military history colloquy at Laurier
last spring, members of the audience
encouraged him to produce the article
published here, and the anonymous
peer reviewers have been equally
positive.
Reg ular contrib ut or Laura
Brandon of the Canadian War
Museum examines printmaking
and other reproduction of works
in the war art programs of the two
world wars. In the First World War,
the art program was organized by
Lord Beaverbrook as something
like a private enterprise, and the
reproductions were sold on a
commercial basis to raise funds. By
contrast, the government sponsored
the Second World War program, and
the wide distribution of reproductions
reveals some of the reasons for official
support, including the value of the
art for propaganda posters. Perhaps
more important was a conviction
that art should be encouraged for
the benefit of Canadian society and
culture, an idea that in part can
be traced to government funding
of art projects in the United States
during the Depression as part of the
Roosevelt administration’s “New
Deal” for economic recovery.
Sean Maloney, another regular,
presents a first-person account of
a Canadian-Afghan operation in
August 2008 built around Canada’s
capable armoured forces. These have
proved invaluable in the broken,
constricted, heavily overgrown
terrain that features in key parts
of Kandahar province. In the early
part of this piece the doubts about
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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the continued value of heavy
armour expressed so vehemently
in the recent past are answered by a
chilling account of a light armoured
vehicle’s instant destruction, with
heavy casualties to the crew, by
an improvised explosive device. It
brought to mind a talk by General
Hillier in 2004 when he explained that
in the Afghan environment, one really
needed the protection and precision
punch of a tank to “reach out and
touch someone” – and not least to do
so with minimum losses both to our
personnel and noncombatants.
This issue has two special
features, both cinematic. Tim Cook
of the Canadian War Museum has
cavassed ten colleagues for their ten
favourite war films. As interesting
as the diversity of the movies chosen
is the commentary by each of the
historians. Wittingly or not, these
are auto-biographical. Films, as
much as books (and music) evoke
powerful memories on the part
of the viewer about when she or
he first saw the work. Here is a
snapshot of the markedly different
life experiences and perspectives that
have brought some of this country’s
leading teachers, writers and museum
professionals to military history.
Tim collaborated with Christopher
Schultz of the University of Western
Ontario to produce the second
feature, an analysis of the historical
content of Paul Gross’ important
film Passchendaele. Christopher, who
has worked in film studies as well as
history, and Tim, who has worked
on many exhibits in several media
aimed at broad audiences, are both
well qualified to comment on the
compromises with scholarship so
often essential in a cultural product
with a hefty price tag. It is worth
noting that the $20 million budget for
Passchendaele was roughly equal to the
whole budget for exhibit planning,
design and construction, including
artifact conservation and preparation,
for the new Canadian War Museum
building. The exhibits were

designed to last (with maintenance
and periodic upgrades) for about
a generation. Thus Christopher
and Tim’s speculation that Gross’
film will, with the limited funding
available in Canada’s cultural sector,
likely have to stand for a generation
or more seems exactly correct from
the financial perspective.
Roger Sarty
August 2010

Dear sir,

A

rlene Doucette has been diligent
in her article “From Belgium to
Broadway” (Canadian Military History,
Spring, 2010) in tracing the connection
between the Watson and Massey families
and the chain of events that may led
the button, reportedly taken at Ypres,
being bequeathed to the Canadian War
Museum.
It is unfortunate that she did not
devote as much attention to the button
itself, which is actually not a German
button. A little research into heraldic

continued on page 80…
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